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SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
CM: Caroline McMaster (Respondent) 
 
SO: This is Sue Onslow interviewing Carolyn McMaster at the Lord Elgin 
Hotel in Ottawa on Monday, 25th March 2013. Carolyn, thank you very 
much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I wonder if you could begin by 
saying, please, how did you become interested in Commonwealth affairs 
in the first place? I know you were at the London School of Economics 
doing a Masters in International Relations in the 1970s and I wondered if 
this had any input in your later professional career? 
 
CM: It did, but I would like to go back further and say something about the 
Canadian educational system. When I was growing up we used to be taught 
about the Commonwealth. Unfortunately that is not the case anymore. People 
are not taught about Canadian history either, but I think as a child going 
through school in the 1950s and 1960s you became very aware of the 
Commonwealth and exciting things happened in the Commonwealth too, with 
India and then the various African countries that started to become 
independent. My parents were always very interested in international affairs 
and we talked about it a lot at the dinner table so that sparked it. My interest 
in doing a thesis on Malawi at the LSE was prompted in a large part by the 
fact that my brother was in Malawi as a CUSO volunteer. I had gone out there 
to visit him and realised what a fascinating situation Malawi was in the mid to 
late 1960s. So that was probably my introduction to the Commonwealth. I 
continued that interest because it seemed such an unlikely grouping of 
countries. There was the colonial heritage but the fact that all those ex-
colonies wanted to be part of this grouping as I was going through university 
was remarkable - and still it seems to me quite remarkable. 
 
SO: How far do you feel for French Canada and English Canada, the 
Commonwealth in fact enables a plurality of identity for Canadians? 
 
CM: It does and certainly in the times that I was a civil servant there was a very 
careful balance in Canada between support for the Commonwealth and 
support for the Francophonie; and this in a sense reinforced our identity as a 
bilingual bicultural country. Those of us who worked on the Commonwealth 
quite often felt that the Commonwealth got short shrift while the Francophonie 
got a little too much attention. But I think for a long time that was an important 
pillar of Canada’s foreign policy; that we balanced those two sides of our 
cultural heritage. There used to be a joke in Foreign Affairs and CIDA that if 
there was any international organisation going we would join it! The lists of 
acronyms that had Canadian membership would go on for pages. In a sense 
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it was true, we were very outward looking and very internationalist for a long 
time. That was something, if you were at all interested in international affairs, 
you were brought up with. That was part of the Canadian being. 
 
SO: Did your brother, as a Canadian ‘Peace Corps’ volunteer, … 
 
CM: CUSO was actually before Peace Corps. 
 
SO: It was indeed. Did he go into the Canadian foreign service as well after 
CUSO? 
 
CM: He went into CIDA as well and then he went in the Foreign Service de facto 
because he became our ambassador in the Ivory Coast; but most of his 
career was CIDA, whereas I switched over half way through. 
 
SO: So you joined CIDA in 1972 to work as a policy analyst at the policy 
branch and then in 1977 you joined the ‘Anglophonie’ or, as you said, 
the Commonwealth Africa branch. 
 
CM: Yes. 
 
SO: It already seems rather an archaic description - as a planning officer for 
Malawi. What had been your thesis topic at the LSE? 
 
CM: Malawi’s foreign policy. 
 
SO: And it looked at both foreign policy and development? 
 
CM: Yes. I was hired to be the planning officer for Malawi given that. Now there 
was a wrinkle in that I published my thesis and it had been banned - and so 
was I. So they were taking a bit of a risk hiring me to be the planning officer 
for Malawi. 
 
SO: Who had banned it? 
 
CM: The government of Malawi. It was on the banned book list, right under “More 
Joy of Sex”. Unfortunately it did not increase my book sales. 
 
SO: What had been your source base for doing your thesis research? 
 
CM: Well, this is why I didn’t do it as a doctorate, but did it as an M.Phil thesis 
because there were limited primary source bases. I did go out and stay with 
my brother and sister in law because my brother went back as the CUSO 
director to Malawi. I spent two months with them and talked to a lot of people 
informally, shall we say. I talked to a lot of former colonial officers who were 
back in the UK but much of my research unfortunately had to be secondary 
because you just didn’t do research on Malawi. 
 
SO: No, as you say, there would have been limited access to archival 
material. 
 
CM: Yes, Dr Banda did not approve. In fact my book never got unbanned until he 
died. I got, however, forgiven – this was actually a bit funny. 
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SO: It sounds like papal dispensation! 
 
CM: Well, it was because I went on a trip with Nick Hare who was then the director 
of the whole Southern and Eastern Africa programme and this was to see if I 
would be allowed back in. When we flew into Blantyre I was afraid that I might 
be on the next plane out. It turned out that Dick Matenge, who had been the 
Permanent Secretary of Education when my brother was the CUSO field 
director, was a very good friend of his. Dick Matenge was then a minister and 
he told Dr Banda it had been youthful folly on my part. He said this with a 
smile because he wanted to get me back in, so I was allowed in. 
 
SO: What was your view of CIDA’s role in Malawi when you started to 
become involved on the ground as a policy planning officer, rather than 
from an academic analytical view? 
 
CM: I thought we were doing really interesting work and I thought Malawi, despite 
its relations with South Africa, was developing a very sensible economic 
development policy based on smallholder agriculture which the World Bank 
was supporting and a number of other donors were supporting.  They had 
some very large projects as well which we were involved with – building the 
railway from Blantyre across into Zambia which was a necessity; but there 
was a lot of focus on smallholder agriculture, and smallholder living 
conditions, improving training, etc. I was quite proud of that programme. 
 
SO: What was your particular view of Malawi’s foreign policy? I appreciate 
this was not something that you could have publically articulated at this 
particular point - but Malawi was unusual, in its diplomatic relations with 
Rhodesia, and of course also South Africa. 
 
CM: I think I first went out to Malawi being very purist and became much more 
pragmatic. Malawi, as did a number of countries, had so many migrant 
workers in South Africa, that they had a real interest in making sure those 
migrant workers had some sort of channel of communication between the two 
governments; and that was something that was certainly bolstered by the 
relationship between Malawi and South Africa in a way that didn’t happen with 
some of the other countries that sent migrant workers. It was a very pragmatic 
policy. I think Malawi benefited from it and realistically I don’t think that they 
were hurt by the fact that the countries around them disapproved so much 
about it. 
 
SO: So there weren’t unofficial sanctions which were levied against Malawi 
because of its highly distasteful foreign policy pragmatism? 
 
CM: I think a lot of the other countries recognised that, given Malawi’s level of 
poverty, they had remarkably few options. They couldn’t take principled 
stands, unlike Zambia. Zambia, even though it squandered it, had a very 
productive resource base and they had more to fall back on. 
 
SO: The Kaunda government also ‘fell back’ of course on Chinese support 
for the TanZam railway; but Malawi, as you say, didn’t have the luxury of 
those choices, given its particular political economy at independence 
and lack of links with the outside area. 
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CM: Yes. 
 
SO: So you were based in Malawi from 1977 as first country officer? 
 
CM: Yes, I wasn’t actually there, but I was going twice a year. 
 
SO: Then in 1979 you were transferred to the Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland programme as planning officer? 
 
CM: Yes. 
 
SO:  You were then posted to Pretoria as your regional base? 
 
CM: In 1980, yes. 
 
SO: That was a particularly interesting time, wasn’t it? 
 
CM: Oh, it was a fascinating time. 
 
SO: Because that was the time of the transition of Zimbabwe to 
independence in April of 1980. So what are your recollections of 
Botswana’s particular position, caught on ‘the racial frontline’, shall we 
say, in Southern Africa? 
 
CM: They were doing their best to counter apartheid to the extent possible without 
laying themselves open to overt attacks by South Africa which, as they had 
seen in the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa was quite prepared to do. South 
Africa had no scruples about what it did in terms of, not exactly invasions, but 
incursions and infiltrations and judicious assassinations. 
 
SO: That was all part of the South African government’s specific counter 
insurgency programme – as you say, bomb blasts, assassination 
attempts, supporting the RENAMO dissident group in neighbouring 
Mozambique, and UNITA in Southern Angola.  But how much discussion 
do you recall with higher level policy people in Botswana, Lesotho or 
Swaziland on these issues, or were these discussions among your 
Canadian diplomatic colleagues? 
 
CM: It was more among the Canadians because I was really focused on the aid 
programme at that stage and the people I met in the three little countries as 
well were the aid people. We all talked about the dependence of the three 
countries on migrant labour, the fact that South Africa could turn the screws at 
any point. We talked about what was happening north of the border in 
Zimbabwe and how South Africa was clearly getting very edgy about that. 
Certainly I knew a certain amount about cross border activities, particularly 
with Botswana because that was a channel for getting people out. 
 
SO: Was CIDA informally involved in any of that support for exiled South 
Africans who might be based in Botswana, or for the returning refugees 
from Botswana going back into Zimbabwe? 
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CM: Not then, we were a bit later. I am trying to remember when – when 
Zimbabwe became independent we started an aid programme and there were 
various scholarship programmes and retraining programmes. I forget when 
this is now. 
 
SO: I am just trying to place this in context. As far as the liberation 
movements are concerned, a great deal of emphasis has been placed in 
historical scholarship on the role of the Nordic countries. Where would 
you place Canada on this pantheon of aid assistance? 
 
CM: Not as vocal and up front, certainly not in the late 1970s or early 1980s. There 
was a lot of awareness of what was happening in South Africa and there was 
certainly a very strong church movement within South Africa to do something 
about, or within Canada, to do something about South Africa. But it wasn’t 
until probably the mid to late 1980s that Canada as a government started to 
take any concrete actions. 
 
SO: But that is more along a bilateral link you are describing, rather than as 
a multilateral, Commonwealth approach? 
 
CM: Yes, I think we were always in support of Commonwealth activities. John 
Diefenbaker said in 1960 when South Africa left the Commonwealth – I think 
that was very much a Canadian sense that we thoroughly disapproved of 
what was happening in South Africa, but there were very long standing ties 
between Canada and South Africa and that we wanted to help in some way. 
 
SO: Someone has described it to me that ‘Canada, having no national 
interests in South Africa, could afford to have a moral foreign policy’? 
 
CM: That is true, to some extent. We had interest in a funny way because there 
were particularly Catholic missionaries who were all throughout Southern 
Africa from the 1880s and 1890s. 
 
SO: Yes, but did they have particular Canadian denominations? 
 
CM: Yes. Robert Mugabe was trained by the White Fathers. And the White 
Fathers were very prominent in Lesotho, less so in Botswana because there 
isn’t as strong a Catholic trend there, but there had been those sort of 
connections.  There were the Boer War connections - that was the first war 
that Canada fought, in a sense independently, where we fought under a 
Canadian banner. So people remembered that. 
 
SO: These historical touchstones are very important, which later 
generations tend to forget. 
 
CM: The Pretoria Bridge over here on the Rideau Canal is named after Pretoria in 
South Africa because of the Boer War. There was a move a couple of years 
ago to change the name to some current politician and there was a huge 
outcry from local historians who said, “Do you realise what this is 
memorialising?” And people didn’t. 
 
SO: The politics of memorials? 
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CM: But going back to your point: no, Canada was not as overt and principled as 
the Nordics, nor as early. I think we became almost as principled as the 
Nordics eventually and probably in some ways because of the 
Commonwealth tool, we had two fronts on which to work. 
 
SO: So Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland then were the focus of your work 
as a planning officer. What principally did this involve? Was this 
provision of agricultural technological assistance, developmental 
project planning? Was it assistance to schools, or assistance to 
construction of infrastructure? 
 
CM: A bit of everything. We had projects with each of the universities which 
eventually hived off and became separate universities in the three countries. 
We had a lot of training projects – there was an organisation called the 
Institute of Development Management which had, again, outlets in each of the 
three countries. We supported it very heavily throughout the 1980s. We had a 
major development project in Lesotho, up the mountains in an area called 
Thaba-Tseka. They formed a new district, a ninth district of Lesotho, and we 
put huge amounts of money into that. Swaziland was always a bit of a third 
ranking among the three because it was just so much harder to do anything in 
Swaziland. 
 
SO: Because of the politics? 
 
CM: Yes, the very interesting hierarchy there. I think Botswana was in some 
senses our favourite because (a) it was much more independent and (b) there 
was a sense that they were using their development assistance wisely. 
 
SO: That is very much part of the aid development literature – in which 
Botswana is held up as the case study of success as a multi party 
democracy and using its diamonds discovered 1966 in effective 
conjunction with De Beers, and these export earnings for economic 
development. 
 
 As Botswana was caught in the front line of the contest against 
apartheid South Africa which became increasingly embattled after 1980, 
was your sense then that this really did compromise the politics of the 
country? Or was Botswana supported by the Commonwealth in a 
particular way? Were you aware of anything like this? 
 
CM: I know that they were open to refugees from wherever because I remember 
going to visit a refugee camp in 1982 at Dukwe. It was kept quite quiet I know 
because there were fears that because there were a lot of South African 
refugees there that there would be retaliatory attacks. I think anybody who 
worked in Botswana was always aware of this really fine balance they had to 
strike so that there wasn’t a lot of declaratory policy on the part of the 
Botswana government; they didn’t make grand speeches the way some of 
their colleagues further north did; but they did quiet things that helped people 
escape, helped people get training. 
 
SO: Obviously they couldn’t in any way provide front line bases for the ANC 
or MK? 
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CM: No, I think they turned a blind eye in part because their borders were so long 
that they couldn’t patrol them anyway and certainly that border south of 
Zimbabwe was very porous. I remember one friend of mine who worked in 
Malawi on a railway project taking a holiday down at Victoria Falls at that 
funny little strip where Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa all meet and he said it was like the Keystone Cops. He would see every 
stripe of military going past. 
 
SO: The Caprivi Strip? 
 
CM: The Caprivi Strip, yes. At that point that, in a sense, it was a no man’s land; it 
was just used by everybody as a gateway. 
 
SO: As Pretoria was your regional headquarters - you said that you went off 
every month and spent an appreciable amount of time in each of your 
project areas - how much was there a sense that the National Party 
government was a stone wall for you? Did you have reasonable 
connections with South African politicians, or was this not part of your 
remit? 
 
CM: It wasn’t part of my remit. I think my political colleagues found it very difficult 
because we were regarded with a certain degree of suspicion because of the 
stances of our government. We probably weren’t regarded with as much 
suspicion as the Swedes and Norwegians were, but we were certainly not … 
 
SO: You weren’t loved like the Swiss? 
 
CM: No, not at all! The other thing I remember from that period is the sense that 
this was a government that was in for the long haul; that it was going to be 
very hard to dislodge it. It was a very efficient police state and I can remember 
one colleague of mine saying, “This is second only to Israel in its control and 
its security.” Our phones were all tapped, our letters were opened. You 
accepted that. 
 
SO: So the diplomatic bag was not secure? 
 
CM: The diplomatic bag was okay, but regular mail was not. 
 
SO: So there was a sense of surveillance, but then also what comes with 
that is a sense of self-censorship because of your concern about what 
might be said or written? 
 
CM: Precisely. I used to go to a church in Soweto, an Anglican church that had a 
black and white minister. Now they couldn’t stop me because I was a 
diplomat, but as soon as I went in the gates of Soweto I would be followed by 
a police car. You began to take that for granted. So when things started to 
unravel as quickly as they did, I was really surprised. 
 
SO: But you were there before the revolt in the townships of 1984, and then 
leading up to this declaration of the State of Emergency? 
 
CM: Yes. 
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SO: Did you have a sense that things were going to kick off at any time? 
 
CM: Funnily enough, no because by 1982 I had moved to Zimbabwe. 1980 to 
1982 you just had a sense that there was bubbling under the surface but it 
was so firmly held down. Things were so repressed that it seemed unlikely 
that anything was going to happen soon. 
 
SO: Moving to Zimbabwe in 1982: this is in the immediate period before the 
Gukuruhundi campaign. What was your sense of living in Zimbabwe as 
a key Frontline State at this particular point and targeted for South 
African incursions and destabilisation? 
 
CM: There was a sense that it was highly vulnerable and that they had to be very 
careful, which they weren’t, and the retaliations came. There were beginning 
to be rumbles and dissent in Matabeleland and I can remember talking to the 
CCJP (the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace), talking to people 
from there and they were stars through that whole period in trying to bring to 
the public attention what was happening. But you could see the dilemma for 
the Western countries because they wanted to stand up against South Africa 
and here was Zimbabwe on the front line. 
 
SO: Supposedly the example of a multi racial democracy? 
 
CM: Supposedly the example of a multi racial democracy, supposedly. Well, it did 
help various liberation groups, sometimes more reluctantly than willingly. So 
people didn’t want to criticise too much. 
 
SO: This is one of the criticisms held against Britain - that they knew what 
was going on. Certainly when I was talking to the British Second 
Secretary, Roger Martin, in 2006, he was explicit that he was gathering 
information on the violence in Matabeland, but that powers higher up 
didn’t or couldn’t acknowledge the violence. He said his superiors (in 
Harare, and London) didn’t want to know; but I wonder, was it 
knowledge that couldn’t be admitted? I don’t know. 
 
CM: I think it was because it would have … I think particularly in Britain where 
there was still a lot more prejudice than in Canada and other countries about 
Africans’ ability to govern themselves; it would have just reconfirmed a lot of 
existing prejudices and so that wasn’t information that you wanted to have out 
very publically. 
 
SO: Were you debating this with your other Canadian political colleagues, 
about bringing this to wider attention? You say that the CCJP were 
admirable in trying to bring it to the world’s attention. 
 
CM: I was back in Ottawa by the time this happened but I can remember seeing 
telexes come in from Harare about what was happening.  I honestly can’t 
remember if we made any public statements; certainly we would have made 
representations and I know we did have, even though it was highly 
discouraged, we did have people from the High Commission go down to 
Matabeleland and report back. 
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SO: After your short time in Harare you were then moved up to Nairobi as 
CIDA field representative and become head of aid in 1988. This is the 
time of course that Britain was increasingly at odds with the 
Commonwealth over the question of economic sanctions on South 
Africa – there was the acrimonious CHOGM meeting in Vancouver in 
1987 when Mrs Thatcher caused a considerable stir because of her 
opposition; and the Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa was 
set up, but without Britain. Were you following this debate particularly 
closely given your Southern Africa remit? 
 
CM: Yes, I was. 
 
SO: Did you attend the Vancouver event? 
 
CM: I didn’t but one of my colleagues in Harare or in Nairobi went to be the liaison 
officer for the Uganda delegation because we covered Uganda from Nairobi 
and I talked to him a lot when he came back. It was fascinating and it was a 
time I felt very proud of Canadian foreign policy because we were taking I 
think a principled stand, both politically and in the Commonwealth. We 
chaired CFMSA for the whole time it existed. 
 
SO: Yes, so it was under Foreign Minister Joe Clark’s leadership. Were you 
as an expert policy analyst at this particular point, increasingly drawn 
into South African policy on economic sanctions or not? 
 
CM: Not until I got back to Ottawa, no because Kenya, Uganda, Somalia which 
were the countries we covered from Nairobi, were enough of a task. 
 
SO: Between 1986 then and when you came back to Ottawa in 1990 as part 
of the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade – DFAIT – 
as deputy head of the Southern Africa task force, was there a particular 
Commonwealth dimension to your work in Eastern Africa and the Horn 
or was this principally a Canadian bilateral approach? 
 
CM: It was principally Canadian bilateral. We kept an eye on what everybody else 
was doing including the Commonwealth and we had very good donor 
coordination in Nairobi at that stage. 
 
SO: So you were liaising with ODA …? 
 
CM: Yes, as well as USAID and the World Bank and then there is the Nordics, 
Germans and the Dutch. We had a monthly meeting of all the heads of aid in 
the donor countries and that was very helpful. It was coordinated by the World 
Bank; they had a very active head at that stage – a guy named Peter Elgin 
who went on to found Transparency International. He was the World Bank 
race rep at that stage. 
 
SO: So here the Commonwealth then was acting as a part of a multilateral 
development body, rather than under a separate Commonwealth 
identity? 
 
CM: Yes. I was aware from the 1970s of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical 
Cooperation for which I have always had a huge admiration, and I have had 
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very heated fights with my colleagues in Canada and my friends in Australian 
aid about the way the CFTC should operate. I have always thought that the 
great value of the CFTC is that it could act quickly and it could do things in the 
short term, because in many of the countries - and this was especially true in 
the Pacific when I was posted in New Zealand - what they need is somebody 
for three months to help them draft a particular piece of legislation that will 
accord with a UN declaration that they have signed onto or to revise their 
banking regulations. 
 
SO: So being able to draw upon an immediate network of particular 
expertise and to parachute somebody in to do a short-term project? 
 
CM: Yes, it is hugely helpful and also they have access to that wide canopy of 
experts from around the Commonwealth, most of whom have the same 
governmental background. So you don’t have to teach somebody about the 
parliamentary system or the rule of law; people understand that, even if it has 
been distorted by developments since independence. 
 
SO: There is a shared set of administrative values and approaches, even if 
they are not identical? 
 
CM: Yes, and the judicial systems are usually the same. We as Canada have done 
a lot in conjunction with the Commonwealth in judicial training and 
magistrates training, things like that, because it is an area where we have a 
lot of expertise and a lot of interest. 
 
SO: So you are contrasting that then with a certain bureaucratic inertia in 
other international organisations? 
 
CM: Yes, on the part of bilateral/multilateral donors. So when various major 
Commonwealth donors, ourselves included, have pressed the CFTC to 
become more heavily programmed, to project what they are going to do, it is 
totally counterproductive. 
 
SO: Because you want something that is flexible, that doesn’t attach quite 
so many conditionalities, that is more immediate? 
 
CM: Yes, but it is harder to assess. 
 
SO: Indeed, in terms of return on investments. 
 
CM: Yes, you can’t do a nice log frame for it and it doesn’t lend itself to 
bureaucratic accounting back in administrative capitals. For a long time we 
were the top contributor in fact – maybe not, maybe Britain has always been 
more, but we have always been in the top three. 
 
SO: This is again part of the politics of developmental aid? 
 
CM: Oh yes. 
 
SO: Something that was quite hard-fought, back in Ottawa? 
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CM: Oh yes, because when I was head of the Commonwealth section, which was 
from 2000 to 2003, this was when there was much more pressure being put 
on the CFTC and the Commonwealth in general to be accountable, to put up 
measurable targets, to do evaluations and so on and it was making me very 
nervous. I could understand you don’t want your money being frittered away, 
but you have to be accountable to your political constituencies in Canada; but 
to lose that aspect of quick response which was so valuable and which no 
other aid agency provided, I thought was just heart-breaking. 
 
SO: Was this a long fought battle for you? 
 
CM: Yes. I kept losing too. By that stage I was fighting my colleagues in CIDA but I 
was fighting them on the basis of having spent a lot of time in developing 
countries and seeing the need for somebody to be able to get an expert out 
there within six weeks, which the CFTC could. 
 
SO: And a truly knowledgeable expert, not a World Bank project officer who 
read his brief on the plane? 
 
CM: Yes. 
 
SO: Just going back to your position in 1990 when you took the assignment 
in DFAIT on the Southern African task force: you have said elsewhere 
that this group was responsible for the implementation of most of 
Canada’s South Africa policy including sanctions and assistance to 
South African NGOs through the Dialogue Fund. Could you elaborate on 
that? 
 
CM: The Dialogue Fund – I am trying to remember when it was set up, I think it 
was in 1989. It was a fund that was intended to promote dialogue among the 
groups in South Africa who wanted to work for peaceful change because by 
then we recognised that, apart from the church groups who had been working 
all along, there were clearly elements within the Afrikaner community that did 
not want to have a conflagration. They wanted some sort of peaceful 
transition to a different type of government. So this Dialogue Fund was mainly 
for meetings and travel; it brought trade unionists to Canada to talk to 
counterparts here. We funded a number of scholarships, we funded meetings 
in South Africa and outside South Africa of various NGO and church groups 
with government groups or with Afrikaner groups. It was a fascinating and 
totally novel approach. 
 
SO: So this is really facilitation of civil society, rather than formal 
governmental links?   
 
CM: Yes, it was totally unusual for Foreign Affairs. We had never done anything 
like this before. 
 
SO: So where did the idea for the Dialogue Fund come from? 
 
CM: It came primarily I think from Joe Clark, but from a number of people around 
him as well and from the embassy in South Africa who had been very quietly 
active in making connections with groups in civil society and trying to find out 
what they needed to promote change. What they said was, “We need 
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opportunities to get together with other groups, to get together with 
government officials if necessary, with Afrikaner groups in some place that is 
secure and doesn’t have political overtones.” 
 
SO: It sounds a variant of what the British Ambassador, Robin Renwick, was 
trying to do by actually providing space around his invitations to dinner 
at the British Embassy. 
 
CM: For people to go into corners. 
 
SO: Exactly. So this was neutral space that you were providing so that 
differing and highly fragmented communities then could make that 
personal contact with a shared goal of trying to secure peaceful 
transition. So how big was the Dialogue Fund? How much money was 
invested? 
 
CM: It wasn’t huge because it didn’t need huge amounts of money. Again, I will try 
to dig this report out that we did and get it to you. It wasn’t more than about $5 
million. 
 
SO: Was that from the Department of Foreign Affairs’ own budget – i.e. it 
didn’t have to go through Parliament so it didn’t require legislative 
approval? 
 
CM: I don’t think it did. 
 
SO: I am just wondering if this was Canada trying to operate below the radar, 
to act as a facilitator rather than necessarily trying to claim any great 
moral input? 
 
CM: As the years went on we became much more vocal about it and claimed more 
credit for things that had happened; but certainly in the early years, it was 
very quiet and very much under the radar. 
 
SO: Was this up and running when you came back to Ottawa in 1990? 
 
CM: Yes, it was. We also had things through the aid programme that were more 
aid related but mainly scholarship programmes for Southern Africans and 
then as things changed and we got into the transition phase there was a 
much larger aid involvement. We had a very large project that was through 
the IDRC – International Development Research Centre – and that provided 
help particularly with the drafting of the new constitution. That went on for 
three or four years and it was spearheaded by a man named Al Johnson who 
had been our Deputy Minister of Finance. He had come from Saskatchewan 
where he had been part of the Tommy Douglas socialist government that 
brought in Medicare; then he ended up as head of the CBC and then when he 
retired this came up and he just leapt on it. He was, I think, hugely influential 
in showing South Africans some of the pitfalls of constitution building, 
particularly when you have got what is effectively a federal system which they 
refused to say was a federal system, but it is a federal system. 
 
SO: It is indeed; it is not a unitary system. 
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CM: It quacks like a duck…! The other area where I think we had a huge impact 
was in the Bill of Rights and the various human rights components that are in 
the South African constitution. I remember one South African saying to me, 
“What we really like about you is that you don’t tell us what to do the way the 
Americans and the British do! You say, we tried this and it didn’t work and we 
tried this and it worked with limitations and this was quite successful.” But we 
never prescribed, we just laid out examples. 
 
SO: Carolyn, whom were you liaising with on the ground in terms of 
supporting constitution building? Is this part of the CODESA process? 
 
CM: Yes. 
 
SO: So with particular and key individuals within the ANC? 
 
CM: Particularly Cyril Ramaphosa who was very close to this project of ours and 
Leon Wessels and Roelf Meyer. 
 
SO: Was Albie Sachs also one of them? 
 
CM: Yes. I remember, when was it, 1993 or 1994, Al brought a study tour to 
Canada of key CODESA players to look at our federal system and they came 
to Ottawa, they went to Toronto and they also went to Montreal and it was 
organized by IDASA – the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa, which 
was a key player in the 1990s and the 2000s in promoting change in Southern 
Africa and they were key players on Zimbabwe too. That included people like 
General Viljoen on this study tour and Roelf Meyer, Albie Sachs and Brigitte 
Mabandla; it was a really fascinating group. I think it opened their eyes. 
 
SO: What you are saying then is that you brought in not only key legal 
representatives of the ANC, but also members of the trade union 
movement? I am just thinking of Cyril Ramaphosa who had his own 
trade union connections, but also people from the National Party side? 
 
CM: Yes, because I think we recognized all along this was not going to happen 
unless the National Party bought into it. Interestingly enough, Alison Redford 
– that would be a fascinating person for you to talk to – who is the premiere of 
Saskatchewan, was one of the legal advisers as part of this project in the mid 
1990s and she has very strong memories of South Africa. 
 
SO: Carolyn, were you aware whether the Australians were offering the same 
type of advice on constitution building? After all they too are a 
federation? 
 
CM: I don’t think they were because the Australians, as I became well aware of 
when I was posted in New Zealand, are much more focused on the Pacific – 
that is their backyard. They didn’t have as strong links as we did to Africa. 
They were players there and they were certainly active but I don’t think they 
had frankly as innovative a program as we did. 
 
SO: You have made slightly critical comments of the Americans and the 
British - and I can fully understand that! - were you making political 
comments and representations on Mrs Thatcher and her interventions 
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to try to support the Inkatha desire for a greater degree of autonomy 
within the South African state? Was this causing policy angst in 
Canada? 
 
CM: Yes, well certainly the role of Inkatha was causing policy angst everywhere. In 
1994 when it looked as if Buthelezi was going to pull out of the election, I can 
remember going down to KwaZulu-Natal with our junior minister, Christine 
Stewart, to meet Buthelezi, as had everyone who had passed through South 
Africa in the previous six months, to try to persuade him to “play like a nice 
boy”. 
 
SO: I know that a key individual in the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, 
Moses Anafu, was known as ‘Mr Africa’ because of the thousands of air 
miles he totted up to try to keep Inkatha within the negotiations and 
election process, and his other involvement in conflict mediation 
elsewhere in Africa. Did you liaise with Moses? 
 
CM: Oh yes. 
 
SO: Extensively on this? 
 
CM: Yes. 
 
SO: So this is a key case then of the Commonwealth acting as an important 
facilitator below the radar - because this part of the story of the 
Commonwealth’s assistance to South African transition really isn’t 
known. 
 
CM: I am trying to think of who the Canadians were who were in the 
Commonwealth at that stage. Bill Montgomery, who died unfortunately; was 
the head of CFTC. The Commonwealth never had a lot of money to spend but 
it had moral suasion and it had little bits of money again that could be used to 
facilitate, to fill gaps. 
 
SO: How far were you aware that Chief Emeka Anyaoku, the new 
Commonwealth Secretary General, was another important facilitator, 
practicing his ‘good offices’? 
 
CM: I certainly became aware in the lead up to the Cyprus CHOGM in 1993 
because that was when we lifted the sanctions and that was such a major 
step. 
 
SO: Because before then Brian Mulroney had been very attentive to make 
sure that Canada didn’t lift its economic sanctions before Nelson 
Mandela gave the go ahead. Senator Hugh Segal was quite emphatic 
about talking about that, from his viewpoint as Prime Minister 
Mulroney’s Chief of Staff. 
 
CM: Yes, there were many phone calls but I remember when Thabo Mbeki was at 
Cyprus, not obviously with any formal role but was certainly widely consulted. 
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SO: But you were then one of the key officials in trying to liaise with the 
Canadian stance on sanctions with the ANC. Were you a link person, or 
were you actually required to have any policy input on this? 
 
CM: I had policy input. I was the person who wrote the memorandum to the 
Cabinet on lifting the sporting sanctions which was a lot of fun because I 
firmly believed that the sporting sanctions had a huge impact. People start to 
roll their eyes when I say this and say, “It was the financial sanctions.” 
Financial sanctions obviously had a lot of clout but I think the sporting 
sanctions really got the Afrikaners where it hurt. 
 
SO: I remember teaching a young South African Afrikaner undergraduate in 
the 90s and he said, “We want to be able to participate at international 
level.” For a sport mad nation, not to be able to do this was a profound 
insult. 
 
CM: Oh yes, it was, and we had a visit very early after the sporting sanctions were 
raised from the General Secretary of the Non Racial Olympic Committee of 
South Africa, Dan Moyo, and I took him around to meet various sporting 
organizations. That was such fun, his eyes were lighting up. Then of course 
South Africa participated in the 1994 Commonwealth Games in Victoria which 
was, I think, a great coup for Canada; Brian Mulroney was out of power by 
then, but Mr Chretien enjoyed it. 
 
SO: Well, still you could take a tremendous amount of pride in Canada 
contributing to this final victory. So in your position then as head of the 
Southern African task force, you worked on the question of sanctions 
and how to fine tune them, how to finesse them, and giving assistance 
to Southern African NGOs through the Dialogue Fund. Did your work 
involve any other aspects of supporting transition? You have also 
mentioned the assistance to the constitutional negotiations drawing 
upon the Canadian example. You weren’t providing any administrative 
training for ANC officials, or any support for their economic strategy 
development, or discussions on the appropriate economic 
developmental approach of a post transition government? 
 
CM: No, our focus was much more on the constitutional legal framework because 
other donors were involved more with the economic side. 
 
SO: So were you collaborating with other donors to make sure that each of 
you dealt with your specific sector and that there was …? 
 
CM: Trying to. 
 
SO: Here I am giving credit to joined up thinking across the Commonwealth! 
 
CM: As we all know, donors aren’t always particularly adroit at coordination. 
 
SO: Possibly not, but did you find yourselves working at cross purposes at 
any particular point? 
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CM: No, I don’t think so. I think a lot of other donors recognized that we had 
something unique to give because of our federal structure and also because 
our Charter of Rights was so new and was a model. 
 
SO: When was your Charter of Rights brought through? 
 
CM: 1982. 
 
SO: So it really was very current in terms of recognizing minority interests 
and rights? 
 
CM: Yes, that is when it was finally enshrined. That was the main focus because 
we also recognized that we are not a huge donor. 
 
SO: So it was where to spend your money that it is most effective? 
 
CM: Yes, and that seemed to be the area. 
 
SO: You made reference to questions of trade union liaison and activity. 
Was the Canadian trade union movement in any way supportive of the 
South African trade union movement? 
 
CM: Yes, in fact another person you might talk to – I can get you his phone 
number – is Paul Purritt who was the International Relations Officer of the 
Canadian Labor Congress through the 1990s. They had a project through the 
Dialogue Fund, again to strengthen trade union leadership and make it aware 
of how it can operate in a more normal democracy. 
 
SO: I know from talking to Carl Wright, who was part of the Commonwealth 
Trade Union movement and then moved to Commonwealth Secretariat 
in the 1990s; his particular workshops in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s 
were expressly designed to try to give form and frame to administrative 
knowledge, expertise, trade union organization – it really was a skill set 
facilitation exercise. Were you involved in any of those types of training 
exercises? 
 
CM: What we tended to do was, with the CLC project we gave them a certain 
amount of money; they said what they were going to do with it and they went 
ahead and did it and then reported to us. We didn’t sit on them. 
 
SO: At this particular point, we are talking about transition at the end of the 
Cold War and I know that as far as the labour movement was concerned, 
it had inevitably become tied up with left versus far left attitudes. There 
had been concern within the broader international trade union 
movements, which of course itself was split, about whether it might be 
problematic that the ANC as a broad church was particularly in thrall to 
the SACP – South African Communist Party – and the implications that 
this had then for the future complexion of South Africa. Was that also 
part of the policy discussions?  I know that the Berlin Wall came down 
on 9th November 1989, but perceptions, attitudes and policies take 
longer to work out. 
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CM: Certainly there was concern within the Canadian government about the 
influence of the SACP and the influence of the SACP on the trade union 
movement and on the ANC in general. I don’t think it was a concern felt as 
keenly perhaps by our neighbours to the south because we had never had 
that anticommunist paranoia that certainly the United States had, nor had we 
had the sort of spy problems. 
 
SO: So Canada had never gone through its version of the Joseph McCarthy 
era, so there was not the same pathological concern about 
communism? 
 
CM: No, not at all. We have maintained relations, warm and sometimes cool 
relations, with Cuba forever despite what our neighbours to the south think 
about that. 
 
SO: It seems to me that the Commonwealth provided an organization which 
again gave differentiation to Canada within the international community 
against America? 
 
CM: Yes, it did and we value that. We used to value that. 
 
SO: Perhaps you will again. 
 
CM: Perhaps we will again. And certainly Mr Chretien saw the value of the 
Commonwealth both on South Africa and then increasingly on Zimbabwe and 
a lot of our Zimbabwe policy was acted out through the Commonwealth. We 
ran the Commonwealth committee on Zimbabwe; he played a major role in 
Abuja trying to mediate between Tony Blair and Thabo Mbeki – not very 
successfully, they were at loggerheads. 
 
SO: I realize that this is leaping ahead because you went down to Pretoria as 
Deputy High Commissioner and then headed Canada’s working group in 
the build up to the 1999 Durban CHOGM meeting. Of course the Abuja 
CHOGM was in 2003. If I could just take you back through your career’s 
chronology: as Deputy High Commission from 1994 and you had also 
been part of the election monitoring group at the extraordinary South 
African election in April 1994. 
 
CM: That was one of the high points of my life, I think. 
 
SO: In what way? 
 
CM: Well, to see the value of an election in the eyes of people who had never 
voted before. I was posted in the Northern Province which had three former 
homeland territories and also had some of the most hard line Afrikaner areas 
in all of South Africa. In fact, one of the voting stations that we were supposed 
to monitor got blown up two days before the election in a town 20 km south of 
Pietersburg, Potgietersrus, and it was probably the most chaotic of all the 
areas of South Africa. The first day that we went around, most voting stations 
didn’t have their supplies, the people weren’t properly trained – we had gone 
through a training session in Johannesburg and so we knew more than some 
of the officials about how this ought to be run. But people stood there for 10 or 
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12 hours in the blazing sun because they were going to vote and it was just 
awe inspiring. 
 
SO: So this was a Canadian election monitoring group; it wasn’t part of the 
UN, it wasn’t part of the Commonwealth election observers mission, it 
was Canadian? 
 
CM: We had Canadians on all those ones as well. In fact we had about 200 
Canadians throughout South Africa under various auspices – there were NGO 
ones, there were labour union ones – but we had a group of 25 people led by 
Christine Stewart who was our Junior Minister for Africa & South Africa and 
we had five groups, each group had three or four people, one person from 
foreign affairs or CIDA as a sort of minder and then two experts or MPs or 
whatever. Obviously with that small a group we were very strategically placed, 
we had two in the Northern Province and one in KwaZulu-Natal, one in 
Gauteng and one down in the Western Cape. We collaborated very closely, 
particularly with the UN, because they were everywhere but we also 
collaborated with the Commonwealth because they had the great advantage 
that they send their people out weeks in advance so they had a better 
knowledge of all the contacts and what was going on on the ground, so we 
had very close cooperation with those groups. There probably wasn’t the 
need for a separate Canadian monitoring group but I think the Canadian 
government felt we had put so much into the whole issue of South Africa that 
we wanted to be there as a moral triumph and as a separate presence. 
 
SO: So thereafter, what was Canada’s particular input in the broad range of 
policies to continue to assist transition to post apartheid rule? 
 
CM: We continued this constitutional project on for quite a while because they 
were still working through a lot of the arrangements with the provinces. We 
developed twinning arrangements with seven of the provinces, between our 
provinces and their provinces, which were I think quite helpful. Some were 
stronger than others depending on the interests of the premiers and the 
bureaucracies involved. 
 
SO: So it was a bit like the British practice of city ‘twinning’? 
 
CM: Yes, it was. We twinned seven provinces with seven Canadian provinces and 
people went from South Africa to see how things were done in their twin back 
in Canada. Assistance was sent out, usually technical assistance, from the 
province to South Africa. 
 
SO: So in terms of the personal networks again, which is so much the 
Commonwealth’s strength, and exchange of expertise and knowledge 
rather than necessarily large sums of donor assistance? 
 
CM: Yes. The other area where CIDA put money into was a project with the 
Association of Community Colleges of Canada which assisted a number of 
the community college level institutions in South Africa – and again provided 
training and mentorship and scholarships and so on. We did have a project 
with Economic Affairs, a small advisory project. Grant Hawes was my 
colleague who was the head of the CIDA program in the early 1990s here in 
Ottawa and then he went out in 1994 as a CIDA field rep to Pretoria so he 
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was there from 1994 to 1998, when he moved to Malawi. I can get you his 
phone number if you wanted to do a phone interview with him. 
 
SO: Thank you, actually skyping to him might be very good. Carolyn, what 
you are underlining here is actual practical policy, rather than being 
bound up in process and sweeping declarations like the Harare 
Declaration 1991 and the Latimer House Accords in 2003. This is 
actually much more implementation of effective assistance, knowledge 
transfers and also solidarity and support at a grass roots level. 
 
CM: We were very supportive of a lot of the Commonwealth’s other institutions, the 
Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association, the Commonwealth 
Librarians Association, because they all came into South Africa and tried to 
do whatever they could to create links, create networks and provide support.  
One of my great regrets is that very few people know about that other level of 
the Commonwealth and how it operates, the informal Commonwealth. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth after all is an extraordinary association; it has a 
remarkable ability to reinvent itself at points of crisis, but also has been 
in the constant process of evolution. Is the rise through the 1990s of 
civil society actors and non-governmental organisations which have a 
Commonwealth framework significant? People may pooh-pooh this and 
say ‘oh well there are 87 organisations that have all got the label 
Commonwealth and they can’t all be active agents in change and 
assistance’; but there are certainly those at the moment in different 
parts of the Commonwealth and in the different parts of the 
organisational structures which are doing very nicely, thank you. Even if 
at a top political level the Commonwealth seems to be going through 
one of its periodic cycles of angst. Would you agree with that?   
 
CM: Maybe they did rise in the 1990s, I had the sense that many of them had been 
going on before. 
 
SO: I am just thinking about how international politics is also changing. The 
1990s after all is a time of huge flux in the international system following 
the end of the Cold War, and with the process of democratisation which 
is very much part of the Commonwealth’s declared agenda from the 
Harare Declaration. This then opens up a different policy space within 
its councils for other actors? 
 
CM: Yes, and I think some of the other actors would get occasionally a bit annoyed 
at the official Commonwealth because the official Commonwealth wasn’t 
always terribly receptive to what the unofficial Commonwealth was saying; 
whereas the unofficial Commonwealth quite often had better connection in 
areas and had very useful comments to make. 
 
SO: In what way? Was this part of your personal observations in the run up 
to CHOGM of 1999 in Durban? 
 
CM: Actually probably not so much there, it was more when I came back to Ottawa 
to head up the Commonwealth section here. I had been aware in South Africa 
of a number of the informal Commonwealth organisations but when I took 
over the Commonwealth section, you learn about all of them because when 
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you do your briefing books you have to have a list in there and it is quite 
extensive. It is imposing – in fact, it is mind boggling at times. 
 
SO: But it could be said also that the Commonwealth is remarkably adept at 
its networks, even if a particular association’s organisational structure 
is two dedicated people in a back office of Uganda House? 
 
CM: Oh yes, they are and it is very much on the basis of people knowing each 
other, thinking that is a good idea, I will just write so and so in Botswana or so 
and so in Fiji. Those links that are kept up whether it is the librarians or the 
engineers or magistrates. 
 
SO: Does that count as diplomacy, in your view? 
 
CM: It counts as diplomacy in the sense of increasing awareness among people of 
other parts of the world and what are the views of people in other parts of the 
world? And breaking down prejudices and barriers and preconceived ideas. 
 
SO: So, as a facilitator to high level politics and diplomacy, but still an 
unseen part of what the Commonwealth does best? 
 
CM: Yes, and that is where I think the Commonwealth is invaluable but it is so 
hard to quantify. 
 
SO: Well, it is a classic soft power organisation in that sense, bringing its 
limited financial resources to very good effect, through excellent 
pooling of knowledge. Just to go back to Canada’s policy particularly 
and your personal contribution on Canada’s policy towards the 
committee on Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe started to go into meltdown from 
2000 with the growing political crisis following the constitutional 
referendum and the parliamentary elections, then accelerating 
hyperinflation. The role of CMAG emerged from the Auckland CHOGM 
as a corrective for military coups, but increasingly there appeared to be 
a need for it to act in an assistant and corrective role to undemocratic 
regimes. How did you manage this particular policy? Were you fine 
tuning it, or were you indeed implementing it? 
 
CM: Well, we were developing a Canadian position on what CMAG should do. We 
were in favour of a more activist interventionist role for CMAG than some 
other members were and we were trying through gentle persuasion, to put our 
views across to other members of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: How much resistance was there? 
 
CM: There was a fair bit of resistance, quite a bit of resistance on the part of some 
members. That is where I got a totally invaluable lesson in time zones around 
the world because I was forever putting through phone calls to other members 
of CMAG and I remember waking Gareth Evans up. Unfortunately he had his 
cell phone and we didn’t realise that he wasn’t in Australia. 
 
SO: Where was he? 
 
CM: He was somewhere with a six hours time difference. 
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SO: I’ll bet he didn’t appreciate being woken from his sleep? But CMAG was 
also having to deal with the troika of John Howard, Mbeki and General 
Obasanjo at this particular point? There were also the issues of 
personality and dynamics between that triangulation. 
 
CM: Yes, which was difficult to put it mildly and I think Prime Minister Chretien 
played a very helpful role there because he was trusted. He wasn’t seen as 
having any particular axes to grind in the way the UK were seen. I think 
Australia had taken such a hard line that they were mistrusted by quite a 
number of the African countries; and Canada was seen as an honest broker 
to the extent that the Commonwealth came out of that without major damage.  
I think John Chretien can take a certain amount of credit for that. 
 
SO: Is it unusual that he was particularly supportive of the Commonwealth, 
given that he is a French Canadian? Or was this very much in the 
Trudeau line? 
 
CM: Pretty much in the Trudeau line. He saw the value of the organization; he was 
funnily enough always an internationalist. He liked the idea of an organisation 
where small countries had an equal voice; he compared that to the UN where 
small countries could get up and grandstand but what he liked about the 
Commonwealth was that everybody talked and you came to a consensus but 
you listened to everybody. You didn’t say, “I am sorry you have got 10,000 
people. We are not going to listen to you.” 
 
SO: Shades of ‘How many divisions does the Pope have?’ That sort of 
scornful attitude? 
 
CM: Yes, and he found he got frustrated by the Commonwealth, he got frustrated 
by the Secretariat at times. But he saw the value of it, of its bringing together 
this really disparate collection of countries around the world that were facing a 
wide array of problems and this gave them a venue for looking at those 
problems from the different perspectives of the members; and trying to come 
up with statements and possibly actions that could be taken as an 
organisation. 
 
SO: So how difficult was it for you to try to coordinate an inclusive policy in 
the run up to the Coolum troubles of 2002 and particularly Abuja in 
2003, because after all there would be a lot of contested personalities 
and contested approaches in that particular Zimbabwe issue? 
 
CM: It was difficult. It was very difficult, yes. Particularly with the Australians. 
 
SO: Why?  Because John Howard was taking a particularly robust line? 
 
CM: Yes, and normally you think of Canada, Australia, New Zealand as being fairly 
consistent and coherent in their approaches to most issues, but certainly on 
that one it was not. 
 
SO: Why do you think it was that Australia was taking such a robust stance 
rather than a more finely tuned approach to try to include Zimbabwe? 
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CM: I would not really want to comment. I think quite often, frankly, policies on 
issues like that are very much governed by the personality of the leader and I 
don’t think John Howard had a lot of time for the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So there could have been an exasperation factor that kicked in? 
 
CM: Yes, an exasperation frustration factor that had kicked in. I think he was 
getting to the point where he wanted to shake somebody, as frankly we all 
were; but it was what was going to be the most productive way of reaching an 
end that didn’t destroy the Commonwealth and maybe had some impact on 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe took their marbles and went home. 
 
SO: What of Don McKinnon’s role at that particular point? It seems to me 
that having read his memoirs  - despite his best efforts and he really 
was chipping away at the coal face on this particular one - that he would 
sympathize more with the element of Antipodean frustration at African 
obduracy. 
 
CM: We shared the frustration too and we had a lot of support for Don McKinnon 
because he worked his butt off. He and Amitav Banerji put themselves in 
positions where they were yelled at, where they were ignored, where they 
were insulted and they just kept on trying hard. More power to them. But it 
was hard. 
 
SO: You also mentioned the fall out at the Abuja meeting with Tony Blair 
who of course left early and then made that very unfortunate statement 
to the press. 
 
CM: Yes, well when that happened, we all just thought that it was, you know … 
 
SO: Really counterproductive? 
 
CM: Yes. There were times when during that period, Coolum to Abuja, when we 
wondered if the Commonwealth was going to survive this. It would survive but 
would it be just totally destroyed as an organisation that had any credibility in 
terms of adhering to principles. 
 
SO: The paradox is that just as Southern Rhodesia had done, so Zimbabwe 
proved toxic for the region and had also proved enormously 
problematic for Commonwealth cohesion and what it stood for. 
 
CM: Yes, but I remember in Coolum one of my colleagues and I did the first draft 
of the statement on Zimbabwe and then it was a matter of Mr Chretien and 
the other leaders who were pressing for it, persuading the rest of the 
Commonwealth leaders to buy into it. For us, I think, because we had been so 
involved with the South Africa issue, it was so important that (a) we take a 
stand on Zimbabwe but (b) that we try to keep Zimbabwe within the fold so 
that you could work on it. 
 
SO: Consensus again? 
 
CM: Yes, consensus again, but there are some minds that won’t be changed and 
Robert Mugabe’s is one of those. 
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SO: This was as much a failure and an affront to General Obasanjo, as a 
committed Nigerian diplomat and African leader, who had contributed to 
the 1986 EPG in South Africa, and was contributing again to the Troika.  
 
CM: Oh very much so, yes, and we felt that he handled it with huge dignity and 
wisdom, and there are some things that you cannot control. 
 
SO: No, indeed. Then in December 2003 you were of course posted to New 
Zealand, as Deputy High Commissioner: now with a remit for the 
Commonwealth Pacific countries, with Fiji top of the list. 
 
CM: Yes, I think there was one stage where I wrote a telex on Fiji every day when 
we were leading up to the coup which was the only coup I know that has been 
delayed so that they could do the army-police rugby game! 
 
SO: So that they could get that derby out of the way first and then Rear 
Admiral Bainimarama launched the coup! Obviously you were very 
much a Southern Africa specialist, having dealt with Southern Africa 
issues which caused huge tensions within the Commonwealth’s 
councils. How much importance would you attach to the troubles in Fiji 
for the Commonwealth since 1987: its three coups in the late 80s, 
repeated coups at the millennium, and with yet another recent hiccough 
on the road democracy under Bainimarama? 
 
CM: Well, certainly with the creation of CMAG, Fiji became a continuing thorn in 
the flesh. I think for many Commonwealth members until South Africa became 
a democracy, very few people focused on democracy in any other part of the 
Commonwealth; and then I think the Commonwealth woke up to the fact that 
with the Harare Declaration there were principles that had to be applied 
broadly. Then I think Fiji did begin to loom a little larger on the scene but I 
think most of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Australia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific, look at Fiji and just sort of shake their heads that it 
can continue in this strange way that it has through so many years. 
 
SO: Sir Ron Sanders has made the point that growing Chinese American 
investment (the latter because of its regional geopolitical agenda and 
trying to manage China’s rise in East Asia and South East Asia), is in 
part responsible for Fiji’s resistance. To a degree, Fiji doesn’t need 
democracy encouraged by the Commonwealth because it has got 
alternative sources of funding and it can pursue its own road without 
necessarily paying such close attention to the Bill of Rights. Much the 
same model, I think, is also playing out in Sri Lanka with the rising 
Chinese investment there. Now there is a great debate of course about 
the association of democracy and development; do you need 
democracy for development? For the Commonwealth as a values based 
organisation, seeking to facilitate and encourage democracy and 
democratisation, this is problematic. 
 
CM: It is and with the increasing role of China it is going to be, I think, even more 
of an issue. I saw the Chinese influence beginning in Africa but then when I 
was stationed in New Zealand it was so clear what was happening, 
 24 
particularly in terms of things like fishing rights and control of natural 
resources. It is alarming. 
 
SO: How much do you think there is also a misperception about the 
coherence of China’s strategy? You are a supremely well placed policy 
analyst and long term observer; how far would you agree that the 
perception of China is that of a monolith, rather than in fact a much 
more fragmented and disjointed economic actor? That in reality there is 
a marked lack of strategic thinking in Beijing, and little strategic 
coordination with individual actors and entrepreneurs, state owned 
organisations, state enterprises with highly varying access to state bank 
cheaper funds? How much do you think that there is a misperception of 
an all-embracing Chinese move into Africa and the Pacific, for what is 
actually a much more partial and imperfect stop-start engagement? 
 
CM: I think in Africa and the Pacific it is more monolithic because I think there is a 
policy direction. Now there are many actors and some of them go off on 
tangents, but I think there is a direction that the Chinese government is 
pursuing deliberately and the small islands are perfect to be picked off. 
 
SO: They are particularly vulnerable, as you say, in terms of necessary legal 
expertise and the fact that they can’t police their territorial waters. How 
do they deal with incursions when there is illegal fishing or illegal 
exploration or sticking the Chinese flag on an outcrop 12 miles from 
Manila harbour?  
 
 Carolyn, thank you very, very much indeed. If I could follow up with 
other questions, that would be excellent. 
 
CM: Yes of course. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
